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Environmental Policy and Competitiveness: 
The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital1
Anastasios Xepapadeas
Department of Economics, University of Crete
Aart de Zeeuw
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University2
Abstract
The Porter hypothesis suggests a double dividend in the sense that environmental policy improves
both environment and competitiveness. The suggestion received strong criticism from economists
mainly driven by the idea that if opportunities for higher competitiveness exist firms do not have
to be triggered by an extra cost. Therefore, the trade-off for the government between
environmental and other targets remains. In this paper a model is developed which confirms the
last point but which also draws the attention to some general mechanisms that relax the trade-off
considerably. Downsizing and especially modernization of firms subject to environmental policy
will increase average productivity and will have positive effects on the marginal decrease of profits
and environmental damage. Concluding, a double dividend can generally not be expected but the
trade-off is not so grim as is often suggested.
Keywords: environmental policy, competitiveness, Porter hypothesis, capital.
JEL-classification: Q28, O31, F10.
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1. Introduction
In an article that attracted the attention of both economists and policy makers, Porter (1991)
challenged the established notion that tough environmental policies imply private costs that harm
the competitiveness of a country’s industry, by claiming precisely the opposite. For policy makers
(e.g. Gore, 1992) this idea of a possible “double dividend” was like manna from heaven, because
it relieved them of the difficult trade-off between environmental and other economic targets.
Economists, however, are by nature sceptical about the idea of a “free lunch”, and some also
critized this so-called “Porter hypothesis” in the sense that attention is distracted from the cost-
benefit analysis of environmental policy, which is in their view the most important issue (e.g.
Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995).
In short Porter’s argument is that tough environmental regulation in the form of economic
incentives can trigger innovation that may eventually increase a firm’s competitiveness and
outweigh the short-run private costs of this regulation. His argument is mainly supported by a
large number of case studies where firms under strict environmental regulation prove to be very
successful (see e.g. Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
Empirical studies on competitiveness in the meaning of changes in the trade and investment
patterns (e.g. Kalt, 1988, Tobey, 1990, Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins, 1995) do not find
a significant adverse effect of more stringent environmental policies. The existing data are of
course limited in their ability to measure the stringency of regulation but possible explanations
mentioned are that the compliance costs are only a small fraction of total costs of production, that
stringency differentials are small and that investments follow the current state-of-the-art in
technology even if this is not required by the environmental regulation in that country.
In the discussion following the appearance of the “Porter hypothesis” a number of attempts have
been made to identify the mechanisms that can lead to a mitigation of the cost effect of
environmental policy or even to a “double dividend”. The dominant argument is that firms are not
aware of certain opportunities and that environmental policy might open the eyes. The revenues
of these opportunities can then outweigh the costs of compliance. One line of thought is that the
external shock through environmental regulation may reduce intra-firm inefficiencies and
organizational failures (see e.g. Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1997), and move the firm towards
its production possibility frontier: the X-efficiency argument. A second idea is that firms create
A better environment will also have a positive effect on the productivity of other factors through clean air, clean3
water, improved health and so on, but this aspect will not be considered here.
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a first-mover advantage by the development of environmental technology which can be beneficial
in later times when other countries also adopt a more stringent environmental policy. The standard
counter-argument is, of course, that in rational economic modelling it cannot be explained why
firms do not see these opportunities by themselves, which at least implies that the argument does
not have a general validity. It will be true that pollution prevention and innovation triggered by
environmental policy will generally also lower other production costs, but for a rational firm the
conclusion must be that before this policy was adopted it was not beneficial to undertake these
activities. The only arguments that remain in this part of the discussion are the possibility of
positive externalities of the additional R&D and the reduction of uncertainty to the firms about
policy trends.
In the context of strategic trade models, where consumption takes place in a third country,
increased competitiveness means a shift of profits from the foreign firm to the home firm. In a
two-stage model where firms invest in R&D first and then choose output, it is possible to
construct specific examples in which foreign R&D decreases and home profits increase under an
environmental tax, but again this result has definitely no general validity (Simpson and Bradford
III, 1996). On the contrary, the basic story remains that governments have an incentive to distort
the environmental tax downwards from the Pigouvian level in order to lower the costs of the
home firm and shift profits to the home firm (Barrett, 1994, Ulph, 1996), which is sometimes
referred to as “ecological dumping” (e.g. Rauscher, 1994).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the validity of the Porter hypothesis by considering firms’
reactions with respect to both the type and the quantity of equipment in which they invest in
response to changes in the production costs. First it will be shown that an increase in production
costs, brought about by environmental policy, triggers a restructuring of the capital stock in such
a way that average productivity increases . This can already be considered as an improvement of3
the competitiveness of the industry (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), so that this part of the paper
gives a formal basis to that point. It is, however, more interesting to see what happens to net
profits, which will be the focus of the second part of the paper.
The analysis in the paper is based on a model where firms invest in machines of different ages.
Younger machines are more productive and less polluting than older machines, but are more
It is interesting to note here that Nabisco chairman and chief executive J. Greeniaus, when announcing the firm’s4
downsizing, stated that it “was necessary to improve the company’s competitive position and accelerate ‘strong
sustainable earning growth’ in the next century” (Financial Times, June 25, 1996).
Environmental regulations in the 1970s unintentionally accelerated the “modernization” of the U.S. steel industry,5
although this does not mean that the premature scrapping of “obsolete” capital is socially beneficial, because such
plants were presumably producing output whose value exceeded variable production costs (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney
and Stavins, 1995, based on U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1980).
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costly to buy and install in the capital stock. Stricter environmental regulation, in the form of an
increase in the emission tax, will reduce the number of machines of all ages and therefore the size
of the firm. However, the same tax increase will generally also reduce the average age of the
capital stock and thus increase its productivity. It follows that two effects can be distinguished:
a “downsizing” effect and a “modernization” effect. Downsizing refers to the reduction of the
total capital stock.  Modernization refers to the reduction of the average age of this capital stock.4
Environmental regulation accelerates the removal of older machines from the capital stock which
increases its productivity.5
The extra tax burden and the shift in investments and output are not profitable for the firm. This
cost of environmental regulation is, however, mitigated by three effects: downsizing leads to an
upward pressure on prices, modernization leads to a higher productivity of the capital stock, and
downsizing and modernization together lead to lower emissions, so that an environmental target
can be reached with a lower tax than in the absence of this effect. In this paper a situation with
homogeneous capital, where only downsizing occurs, will be compared to a situation with
heterogeneous capital, where also modernization occurs. It is shown that the marginal decrease
in profits is lower and the marginal decrease in emissions is higher in the second situation.
The implication for the debate on the Porter hypothesis is not that a double dividend can be
expected, but the trade-off between improving the environment and the competitiveness of the
home industry is not as grim as it is sometimes suggested because of favourable changes in the
composition of the capital stock.
Section 2 presents the basic model and section 3 derives the optimal age distribution of the
machines. In section 4 the effects of an emission tax on productivity, profits and emissions are



















Consider a firm that can invest in machines of different ages. Let y[0,h] denote the age
of the machine and introduce the following notation:
v(y): is the output produced by a machine of age y, with v1(y)0. That is, a newer machine
cannot produce less output than an older machine. New machines are more productive
since they embody superior technology.
c(y): is the running cost of a machine of age y, c1(y)0.
s(y): are emissions of a machine of age y, s1(y)0. Older machines emit at least as much as
newer machines. This might be the result of a natural deterioration in the condition of the
machine with the passage of time, and/or the result of cleaner technologies being
embodied in the new machines.
Let x(t,y) be the number of machines of age y operating in year t. Then total output produced  in
year t is defined as:
Assume that the firm has to pay an emission tax - per unit emissions. Then the cost of running one
machine is: . Therefore total running costs for year t are defined as:
We assume that markets exist for machines of any age from 0 to h. Let b(y) be the cost of buying
a machine of age y, with b1(y)0 (older machines cannot be more expensive than newer machines)
and b(h)=0 (a machine at the maximum age is not worth anything). 
Let u(y,t) be the number of machines of age y bought (if u(y,t)>0) or sold (if u(y,t)<0) in year t.
The total cost or revenue to the firm from transactions in the machine market is defined as
, with the second term reflecting adjustment costs in buying or selling
machines. These costs are for example, adaptation costs or search costs. 




























We take a discount rate equal to zero because the analysis would otherwise become more complex without adding6
anything to the purpose of this paper.
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(1)
with p the price of output. That is, the firm chooses at each point in time an age distribution of
machines to maximize profits:6
This is an infinite horizon optimal control problem with transition dynamics described by a linear
partial differential equation (Carlson et al. 1991). The transition equation indicates that the rate
of change in the number of machines of a given age, y, is determined by two factors. These are
the reduction in the number of machines of that age as machines become older (the first term of
the transition equation), and the reduction or increase in the number of machines brought about
by the sale or acquisition of machines of the given age y (the second term of the transition
equation). The number of machines of each age at each time has to be nonnegative, while the
initial condition on the number of machines implies that the firm starts with no new machines in
the capital stock.
The generalized Hamiltonian function for this problem is given as



























































In order to obtain tractable analytical results from the above optimality conditions, we consider
the firm at the steady state, in which case 0x/0t=0 and 0/0t=0. By suppressing t and then
denoting , the optimality conditions at the steady state can be written as:
The optimality conditions corresponding to the steady state are equivalent to the
optimality conditions of the optimal steady-state problem (OSSP) associated with problem (1).
The OSSP is defined (Carlson et al. 1991) as:
The OSSP problem is an optimal control problem defined over ages y[0,h], with as state variable
the number of machines of a given age and as control variable the sales or acquisitions of
machines of this same age. The OSSP problem can be thought of as a situation where the firm
chooses the optimal age distribution of the machines in steady state provided that no further
exogenous shocks take place.
In our model the exogenous shock is a change in the emission tax that changes the optimal
age distribution of the machines. In order to determine the effects from changes in the tax































optimality conditions (2), (3.1) and (3.2).
3. The Optimal Age Distribution
Integrating (3.1) we obtain:
The boundary condition of this fixed-horizon optimal control problem, (h)=0, yields the constant
of integration in (4): 
Therefore, (y) is given by:
The value of  as given by (5) reflects the benefits from installing one machine of age y nd
keeping it until it becomes of maximum age. From (2) the optimal sales or acquisitions of
machines of age y is given by:
Note that
which is intuitively clear since  denotes the benefits and b the price of new machines.
The stock of machines of age y is partly determined by sales and acquisitions of machines of that
age and partly inherited from sales and acquisitions in the past. The set of stocks of all ages is the



























is 0 and that the result can be viewed as a function of the tax parameter -. This yields:
The marginal changes of these stocks with respect to the tax rate - are given by:
Therefore, an increase in the emission tax will reduce the number of machines of each age in the
capital stock, which implies that the age distribution of machines is shifted downwards. This is
the downsizing effect of the emission taxes. Furthermore, since total emissions are defined as:
we have that
The important questions, however, are (i) whether this downsizing effect is accompanied by a
modernization effect, or a change in the shape of the age distribution of machines, that increases
the productivity of the capital stock, and (ii) how the increase in the emission tax affects firm’s
profits.
4. Productivity Effects of Emission Taxes
Suppose that the firm has optimized the age distribution of its capital stock, so that the
number of machines for each age is given by (7). The proportion of machines of age y in th




















































Note that f(y,-) is a density function, because . The average age of
the optimal capital stock is defined as:
The basic question is under which conditions an increase in the tax rate reduces the average age
of the capital stock, or .
Proposition 1: A stricter environmental policy will reduce the average age of the optimal capital
stock, if and only if the average age of the optimal capital stock before the tax increase is less
than the average age of the change in the capital stock (which is a reduction as the firm
downsizes in response to an increase in the tax rate), or
For proof see Appendix
Under the condition of the proposition above the downsizing of the firm also causes
modernization of the capital stock. The optimal average age is reduced, as the tax increase
removes the relatively older machines from the capital stock.
To analyse the productivity effects from a reduction in the average age, we define the






































Using a decreasing linear productivity function, defined as v(y)=-y with >0, we have that
In that case, stricter environmental policy, in the form of a higher tax rate, will increase the
productivity of the capital stock when the average age of the capital stock is reduced. The
proposition above gives the condition for this to take place. We will investigate this condition for
general linear functional forms for the variables of the problem.
Consider the case where
where all the parameters are non-negative and at least a  or s  is strictly positive.1 1
This implies that acquisition costs b decline linearly with age y of the machines and running costs
c of the machines are constant. Output v is linearly decreasing with age y while emissions are
linearly increasing, with at least one of them in a strict way.
The following proposition can then be stated.
Proposition 2: Under the assumptions made above about the functional forms of output, rnning
costs, acquisition costs and emissions, an increase in the emission tax will reduce the optimal
average age of the capital stock and increase its average productivity.






























Thus when the downsizing effect is accompanied by a modernization effect a stricter
environmental policy can increase the average productivity of the capital stock. It should be
noticed, however, that the increase in productivity can not be solely attributed to a stricter
environmental policy. In case, for example, that running costs c increase linearly with age y of the
machines, it can be shown that in the absence of environmental policy, an exogenous upward
shock to these costs also increases productivity. The result appears again because of a more
general mechanism which is associated with a downsizing of the industry due to an increase in
costs and an accompanying modernization of the capital stock in the course of the downsizing
process. As with X-efficiency, the positive effects may be caused by an external shock in general
and not exclusively one in relation with an environmental problem.
A stricter environmental policy can thus increase the average productivity of capital and
reduce emissions at the same time. These effects can, however, not be regarded as a double
dividend unless the effects of emission taxes on profits are positive as well.
5. Profit Effects of Emission Taxes
In order to analyse the profit effects of emission taxes, we consider a case where the firm
subject to the environmental tax represents the home industry. This industry competes with a
similar industry in another country which is not subject to the environmental tax -.
Given the price p and the steady-state optimal age distribution of machines given by (7)
total output for the home industry is given by:
Suppose that the demand for the output of the home industry and the industry abroad














































































The equilibrium price becomes
where
and
Using these expressions the steady-state optimal age distribution of machines becomes
where
with indicating the reduction in the capital stock of the home industry
due to the downsizing effect of the environmental tax.
























































profits can be split into two parts. A change $  as a result of the changes in the price, the cost1
of emission taxes and the age distribution of machines, and a change $  as a result of the changes2
in the transactions on the machine market.
The first change in profits becomes
Because the net result from transactions on the machine market is given by
the second change in profits becomes
In order to obtain a tractable expression for the total change in profits $(-), lemma 1
from the Appendix is used. By renaming y into ' and z into y in the right-hand side of lemma 1 it
is easy to see that the second term of $ and the second term of $  cancel out, and that the1 2








































Note that in order to determine the optimal tax it is necessary to determine the costs of total emissions to society.7
The purpose of this paper is, however, to analyse the effect of a non-homogeneous capital stock, for which such
a valuation is not necessary.
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and
Thus the change in profits is a quadratic function of the environmental tax -, with $(0)=0.
Furthermore,
so that with an increasing environmental tax - the profits $ decrease monotonically until the
steady-state optimal age distribution of machines has decreased to zero. In the interval from -=0
until the value - >0 at which the resulting machine distribution is zero, the change in profits ismax
negative and decreasing in the environmental tax -.
However, with an increasing environmental tax - total emissions S also decrease according to7
Having established that stricter environmental policy reduces both profits and emissions
in the home industry, we now turn to examine the relative effects of a stricter environmental policy
when the downsizing of the home industry is or is not accompanied by a modernization of the
capital stock. We compare two cases: In the first, the benchmark case, the productivity of the





























From proposition 2 it follows that, with the linear productivity function v(y) = 8a(h-y)/3h assumed above and the8
constant emission function s(y)=s, the average productivity of the capital stock increases. 
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machines have a higher productivity so that a stricter environmental policy can generate a
modernization effect. 
Consider as a benchmark the case where all machines have the same productivity v(y) = a,
the same running costs c(y) = c (= 0), the same emissions s(y) = s, but have different costs of
buying b(y) = b(h-y), because newer machines last longer.
Straightforward calculations show that the steady-state optimal age distribution of machines before
tax with the initial equilibrium price p  becomes0
with total emissions equal to s(p a - c - b)Dh .0
3
The benchmark will be compared with the case where the machines’ productivity decreases with
age according to v(y) = 8a(h-y)/3h. It is easy to show that this specification leads to the same total
output, initial equilibrium price and total emissions before tax as in the benchmark case. However,
this variable productivity function can lead to an increase in the average productivity of capital
through the modernization effect described in the previous section.8
Suppose that now an environmental tax - is levied.
In the benchmark case the equilibrium price becomes with
 while, for the varying productivity case the equilibrium price becomes  with
Using this framework the following proposition can be stated



















emissions and profits by a stricter environmental policy in the home country, in the benchmark
and varying productivity cases respectively. Then under the assumptions made above
 
For proof see Appendix
Thus when the industry can change the composition of its capital stock by buying newer
more productive machines, and this action is induced by a stricter environmental policy the
reduction in emissions is larger and the reduction in profits is smaller as compared to the case
where no such action is possible. Therefore it can be stated that when the downsizing of the home
industry due to a stricter environmental policy is accompanied by modernization of its capital
stock, there are smaller losses in profits and greater gains in emission reductions relative to the case
where modernization is not possible. 
6. Conclusions
Using a model in which firms can invest in machines with different characteristics, where
newer machines are more productive and “cleaner” but also more expensive than older machines,
we isolated two effects resulting from the introduction of a stricter environmental policy in the
form of a tax on emissions: A productivity effect and a profit/emission effect.
The productivity effect implies that if the downsizing of the firm due to the stricter
environmental policy is accompanied by a modernization effect, which means a reduction in the
average age of the capital stock, then the average productivity of the capital stock increases.
The profit/emission effect indicates that profits and emissions decrease with a stricter
environmental policy. However, in the case that the capital stock can be composed of newer more
productive machines and older less productive machines the effect of an environmental tax is better
in two ways, as compared to the case where modernization of the capital stock is not possible: the
marginal decrease in emissions is higher and the marginal decrease in profits is lower.
Therefore, our results indicate that although a stricter environmental policy can not be
expected to provide a double dividend in the sense of both reducing emissions and increasing
18
profitability in an industry, we may expect increased productivity of the capital stock along with
a relatively less severe impact on profits and more emission reductions, when the stricter policy
induces modernization of the capital stock. The trade-off between environmental conditions and
























































Proof of proposition 1
The proposition follows by taking the derivative
setting the numerator less than zero and rearranging terms, where it should be noted that the
change in the capital stock is negative b
Lemma 1
Proof
Change the order of integration of z and y b
Proof of proposition 2
First, the terms of the two ratios of the condition of proposition 1 are developed separately.

























































































































By changing the order of integration, the second part of 6  can be written as:1
Combining these two results we obtain:
Similarly, the second term becomes:
Furthermore,






































































It follows that the condition of proposition 1, 6 / 6  < 6  / 6 , becomes:2 1 4 3
For v(') = a, c(') = c, b(') = b(h-') and s(') = s both the left-hand side and the right-hand side
of this inequality are equal to 5h/8. Furthermore, it is easy to see that for s(') = s  + s' with s  >0 1 1
0 the right-hand side is larger than 5h/8 and that for v(') = a  + a ' with a  > 0 the left-hand side0 1 1
is smaller than 5h/8. b
Proof of proposition 3
By straightforward calculations we obtain:
while
Thus it follows that the marginal decrease in total emissions is larger in the case with the varying
productivity than in the benchmark case.
Furthermore, straightforward calculations show that in the benchmark case the marginal change in
steady-state profits becomes:










 (1/45)p v21 a















Thus it follows that the marginal decrease in profits is already smaller for - = 0 in the varying
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